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Abstract
A strong representation of a committee, formalized as a simple game, on a
convex and closed set of alternatives is a game form with the members of the
committee as players such that (i) the winning coalitions of the simple game
are exactly those coalitions, which can get any given alternative independent
of the strategies of the complement, and (ii) for any proflle of continuous and
convex preferences, the resulting game has a strong Nash equilibrium. In the
paper, it is investigated whether committees have representations on convex
and compact subsets of Rm. This is shown to be the case if there are vetoers;
for committees with no vetoers the existence of strong representations depends
on the structure of the alternative set as well as on that of the committee (its
Nakamura-number). Thus, if A is strictly convex, compact, and has smooth
boundary, then no committee can have a strong representation on A. On
the other hand, if A has non-smooth boundary, representations may exist
depending on the Nakamura-number (if it is at least 7).
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1 Introduction
The study of committee decision making in political and economic environments has
been the subject of many investigations since Black (1948). At this point we shall
only mention Arrow (1951), Moulin (1980), Barberµa and Peleg (1990), Zhou (1991),
and Barberµa, Gu˜l, and Stachetti (1994). For a recent survey of closely related work
the reader is referred to Sprumont (1995).
Black (1948) and Arrow (1951) introduced the class of single-peaked preferences
on the real line. For this class of preferences, the analysis of the decision making of
a simple majority committee leads to the median voter rule. This rule is (coalition-
ally) strategy-proof, anonymous, and Pareto e–cient. In Moulin (1980) all voting
rules (on the class of single peaked preference proflles) which are strategy-proof,
anonymous, and e–cient, have been characterized. Moulin’s work has been reflned
by several authors (see Sprumont (1995)), so that now committee decision making
on (a closed convex subset of) the real line with single-peaked preferences is fully
understood (see also Section 8 in the present paper).
Clearly, assuming that choice set is one-dimensionsional is very restrictive. In
many real-life problems we have to deal with several issues simultaneously or allocate
the budget to several projects. However, the problem of extending Moulin’s results
to higher dimensions remained open till Zhou (1991). In his paper, Zhou generalizes
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (see Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975))
to economies with pure public goods. In terms of the theory of committee decision
making, Zhou’s result can be described as follows: Let A be a closed and convex
subset of Rm, m ‚ 2, and let the dimension of A be m. Further, let G be a non-
dictatorial commitee (i.e., G is a non-dictatorial (monotonic and proper) simple
game), and let f be a social choice function which has the following properties: (i)
f induces the same power structure (among the players) as G, (ii) f is deflned for
(proflles of) continuous and convex preferences (on A). Then (under all the foregoing
assumptions), f is manipulable.
The work of Zhou (1991) is the starting point of our investigation. Our method
for flnding satisfactory voting rules for pure public goods economies can be described
in the following way. Let G = (N;W ) be a committee, and let A be a convex and
compact subset of Rm of full dimension m, for m ‚ 2. The pair (G;A) will be
called a choice problem. The core of a choice problem (G;A) with respect to a
proflle »´N of preferences is deflned in the usual way (see our Section 2 below). We
mainly consider stable choice problems, that is, choice problems (G;A) such that the
core C(G;A; »´N) 6= ; for every proflle »´N of continuous and convex preferences.
We remark that if G is weak (i.e., G contains at least one vetoer), then (G;A) is
stable (for every compact set A). For a non-weak committee G, (G;A) is stable ifi
m • ”(G)¡2, where ”(G) is the number of G (see Greenberg (1979) and Le Breton
(1987)).
Now, let (G;A) be a stable choice problem. We ask whether there exists a game
form ¡ with the following properties:
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(i) ¡ (partially) implements the core C(G;A; ¢) on the (restricted) domain of
continuous and convex preferences in strong Nash equilibria;
(ii) the power structure induced by ¡ on N (i.e., the set of members of G), is equal
to G.
If a game form ¡ satisfles the foregoing conditions (i) and (ii) with respect to
a (stable) choice problem (G;A), then we say that ¡ is a strong representation of
G on A. In this paper we study the existence of strong representations of choice
problems. Our study is motivated by the following two claims:
(a) A strong representation of a choice problem (G;A) is a satisfactory (general-
ized) voting procedure that enables the committee G to choose a member of
A.
(b) There exist important families of choice problems which have strong represen-
tations.
We shall now elaborate on these two claims. Let (G;A) be a choice problem, and
let ¡ be a strong representation of G on A. As ¡ is a game form, it may be considered
as a generalized voting procedure for G (the ordinary voting procedures are given by
social choice functions). Indeed, quite a few voting rules are given by game forms;
approval voting is a well-known example. In addition, each voting game that is
induced by ¡ (in conjunction with a proflle of continuous and convex preferences)
has a strong Nash equilibrium. This strong stability property is not implied, for
example, by the existence of equilibrium in dominant strategies. Finally, ¡ truly
re°ects the power structure represented by G.
In order to justify claim (b) we shall mention two of our results: (1) If G is weak,
then (G;A) has a strong representation for every A (that satisfles our assumptions);
(2) assume that A = Rm and that m • ”(G) ¡ 2. If we restrict ourselves to
continuous and convex preferences which are also bounded (i.e., the upper level sets
are bounded; see Section 3), then (G;A) has a strong representation. We remark
that preferences which are derived from a weighted Euclidean distance (see Enelow
and Hinich (1984)), are bounded.
We can now summarize our approach: Using the nonemptiness of the core of a
choice problem (G;A), we flnd strongly stable (generalized) voting procedures for
G (i.e., procedures which are stable when combined with continuous and convex
preferences on A). The manipulability problem is avoided because we use game
forms (and not social choice functions). However, as expected, the voting games
induced by our game forms are not solvable by dominant strategies; nevertheless,
they have strong Nash equilbria.
Earlier works on existence of strong representations for committees considered
choice problems with a flnite set of alternatives. The following is a (partial) list of
contributions to the theory of representation: Peleg (1978a),(1978b),(1984), Dutta
and Pattanaik (1978), Ishikawa and Nakamura (1980), and Holzman (1986a),(1986b).
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These works proved existence of strong representations by social choice functions,
whereas we only prove strong representation by game forms. We have to enlarge
the set of possible representations because of the complexity of the representation
problem in the continuous case. Indeed, we obtained some impossibility results
for (the larger set of) game forms. Finally, we should mention the close relation-
ship between representation theory and implementation in strong Nash equilibria
(see Moulin and Peleg (1982) and Maskin (1985) for results on implementation by
strong Nash equilibria).
We now brie°y review the contents of this paper. Section 2 is devoted to defl-
nitions and notations. Existence of strong representations for spatial voting games
is proved in Section 3. Choice problems for committees with vetoers are considered
in Section 4, where it is proved that all such problems have strong representations.
In Section 5, we state and prove the flrst impossibility result (Theorem 5.2) which
may be formulated as follows: Let A ‰ R2 be strictly convex, compact, and smooth,
and let G be a committee without vetoers. Then G has no strong representation on
A. This result can be generalized to higher dimensions (see Theorem 5.3). Small
Nakamura numbers are considered in Section 6. If (G;A) is a choice problem and
”(G) • 6, then G has no strong representation on A. The flrst case which is not
excluded by our impossibility theorems is G = (7; 6) (i.e., a special majority of 6
out of 7) and A is the (two-dimensional) standard unit simplex in R3 (notice that
”(G) = 7 and A is not strictly convex). It is solved in full detail in Section 7. Finally,
the classical case of dimension 1 is brie°y discussed in Section 8. A general result,
extending the basic result of Moulin and Peleg (1982) on representation of efiectivity
functions with flnite sets of alternatives to efiectivity functions with inflnitely many
alternatives, is used at several occassions to prove existence of representations. This
result is stated and proved in an appendix.
2 Deflnitions and notations
Let A be a set of alternatives. Throughout this paper, excluding the appendix, A
is a closed and convex subset of a Euclidean space Rm, m ‚ 1. We always assume
that A is of dimension m. A preference ordering on A is a complete and transitive
binary relation. We denote by P the set of all preference orderings on A. »´ 2 P
is continuous if for each x 2 A, the sets fy 2 A j y »´xg and fy 2 A j x »´ yg are
closed. We denote by Pc the set of all continuous preference orderings on A. »´ 2 P
is convex if for each x 2 A the set fy 2 A j y »´xg is convex. We denote by Pcc the
set of all continuous and convex preference orderings. Finally, if »´ 2 P , then its
asymmetric part ´ is deflned by
[x ´ y] , [x »´ y and not y »´x] for all x; y 2 A:
Let D be a set. We denote by P (D) the set of all subsets of D, that is, P (D) =
fD0 j D0 ‰ Dg. Also, 2D = P (D)nf;g is the set of all non-empty subsets of D.
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Let A be a set of alternatives and let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a flnite set of players.
An efiectivity function (EF) is a function E : P (N) ! P (P (A)) that satisfles the
following conditions;
E(N) = 2A;
E(;) = ;;
A 2 E(S) for all S 2 2N ;
; =2 E(S) for all S 2 P (N):
Let E be an EF. E is superadditive if it satisfles the following condition: If
Si 2 2N , Bi 2 E(Si), i = 1; 2, and S1 \ S2 = ;, then B1 \ B2 2 E(S1 [ S2). E is
maximal if for all S 2 2N and B 2 2A
B =2 E(S) ) AnB 2 E(NnS):
The core of E with respect to »´N 2 PN is deflned in the following way: Let B 2 2A,
S 2 2N , and x 2 AnB. B dominates x via S at »´N , if B 2 E(S) and y ´i x for all
y 2 B and i 2 S. x 2 A is dominated at »´ N if there exist B 2 2A and S 2 2N such
that B dominates x via S at »´N . The core of E with respect to »´N , C(E; »´N), is
the set of all undominated alternatives at »´N . If P^N ‰ PN , then E is stable over
P^N if C(E; »´N) 6= ; for all »´N 2 P^N .
Let A be a set of alternatives, and let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a flnite set of players.
A game form (GF) is an (n+ 2)-tuple ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A), where
§i is the set of strategies of player i 2 N ;
… : §1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ §n ! A is the outcome function.
Let ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) be a GF and let S 2 2N . We denote §S = Qi2S §i.
Let, again, S 2 2N and let B 2 2A. S is fi-efiective for B if there exists ¾S 2 §S
such that …(¾S; „NnS) 2 B for all „NnS 2 §NnS. S is fl-efiective for B if for every
„NnS 2 §NnS there exists ¾S 2 §S such that …(¾S; „NnS) 2 B. The fi-EF of ¡, E¡fi ,
is deflned by E¡fi(;) = ;, and
E¡fi(S) = fB 2 2A j S is fi-efiective for Bg; for S 2 2N :
The fl-EF of ¡, E¡fl , is deflned by E
¡
fl (;) = ;, and
E¡fl (S) = fB 2 2A j S is fl-efiective for Bg; for S 2 2N :
We remark that E¡fi is superadditive, and E
¡
fl is maximal (see, e.g., Abdou and
Keiding (1991)).
Let ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) be a GF and let »´N 2 PN . The pair (¡; »´N) deflnes,
in an obvious way, a game in strategic form. We denote § = §N =
Qn
i=1 §
i. ¾ 2 §
is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) of (¡; »´N) if for all S 2 2N and „S 2 §S, there
exists i 2 S such that
…(¾) »´ i…(„S; ¾NnS):
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We remark that if ¾ is an SNE of (¡; »´N), then …(¾) 2 C(E¡fl ; »´N) (see Peleg
(1984)). ¡ is SNE-consistent over P^N ‰ PN if for each »´N 2 P^N the game
(¡; »´N) has an SNE.
Let ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) be a GF and let E : P (N) ! P (P (A)) be an EF. ¡
(partially) implements the core C(E; »´N) over P^N ‰ PN if for every »´N 2 P^N
(…(SNE(¡; »´N)) ‰ C(E; »´N)) …(SNE(¡; »´N)) = C(E; »´N) (here SNE(¡; »´N)
is the set of SNE’s of the game (¡; »´N)).
Finally, we recall some properties of simple games. A simple game is a pair
(N;W ), where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a set of players, and W ‰ 2N is a set of winning
coalitions. Let G = (N;W ) be a simple game. G is monotonic if
[S 2W and S ‰ T ‰ N ]) T 2W;
G is proper if
S 2W ) NnS =2W for all S 2 2N :
We only deal with monotonic and proper simple games. Let, again, G = (N;W ) be
a simple game. G is strong if
S =2W ) NnS 2W for all S 2 2N :
G is symmetric if G is an (n; k) game, that is, there exists n
2
< k • n such that
W = fS ‰ N j jSj ‚ kg (if D is a flnite set, then jDj is the number of members of
D). G is weak if
V = \fS j S 2Wg 6= ;:
V is the set of vetoers of G. If G is not weak, then the Nakamura number of G,
”(G), is given by
”(G) = minfjU j j U ‰ W and \ fS j S 2 Ug = ;g
(see Nakamura (1979)).
Let G = (N;W ) be a simple game, let A be a set of alternatives, let »´ N 2 PN ,
and let x; y 2 A. x dominates y at »´N if there exists S 2W such that x ´i y for all
i 2 S. The core of G with respect to »´N , C(G; »´N), is the set of all undominated
alternatives at »´N . Assume now that A is a compact and convex subset of Rm,
the dimension of A is m, and G is not weak. Then C(G; »´N) 6= ; for all »´N 2 PNcc
ifi ”(G) ‚ m+ 2 (see Le Breton (1987)).
Let E : P (N)! P (P (A)) be an EF. The simple game (N;WE) which is associ-
ated with E is given by
WE = fS 2 2N j E(S) = 2Ag:
E is an extension of the simple game (N;W ) ifWE = W . Let now ¡ = (§
1; : : : ;§n; …;A)
be a GF. The simple game which is associated with ¡ is G¡fi = (N;WE¡fi). ¡ is a
representation of G = (N;W ) if G = G¡fi. ¡ is a strong representation of G if (i) ¡
is a representation of G, and (ii) ¡ is SNE-consistent over PNcc :
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3 Implementation of the core of spatial voting
games
In this section we consider a particular class of choice problems (G;A), namely such
where the set of alternatives is Euclidean space of some dimension m and where
the preferences are bounded in the sense that at each a 2 A, the set of alternatives
which are at least as good as a is a bounded set. The literature on spatial voting
problems, see e.g. Enelow and Hinich (1984), treats particular cases of such decision
problems; we use the term spatial voting games for the entire class.
Let A = Rm, m ‚ 1. We denote by A⁄ the set of all D0 ‰ A such that D0 is open,
convex, and bounded. A preference relation »´ 2 Pcc = Pcc(A) is bounded if for each
x 2 A the set fy 2 A j y ´ xg is bounded. We denote by Pccb the set of bounded
preferences in Pcc. A spatial voting game is an (n+1)-tuple (G; »´ 1; : : : ; »´ n), where
G = (N;W ) is a proper and monotonic simple game, N = f1; : : : ; ng, and »´ i 2 Pccb
for i = 1; : : : ; n.
Theorem 3.1 Let G = (N;W ) be a proper and monotonic game. Then there exists
a GF ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) with the following properties:
(i) For every »´N 2 PNccb, …(SNE(¡; »´N)) = C(G; »´N) (thus, in particular, if
C(G; »´N) 6= ; for all »´N 2 PNccb, then ¡ is SNE-consistent (on PNccb).)
(ii) G¡fi = G, that is ¡ is a representation of G.
Proof: Deflne an EF E : P (N) ! P 2(A) by the following rules: If S 2 W , then
E(S) = 2A, the set of non-empty subsets of A; if S ‰ N , S 6= ;, and NnS 2 W ,
then E(S) = fAg; further, we put E(;) = ;, and flnally, if S ‰ N is blocking, that
is S;NnS =2W , then
E(S) = fD 2 2A j 9D0 2 A⁄ : D ¾ AnD0g:
Thus, if S is blocking and B 2 E(S), then B is unbounded. Now, if S ‰ N ,
S 6= ;, »´N 2 PNccb, x 2 A, and B ‰ Pr(S; »´N ; x), then B is bounded. Hence
C(E; »´N) = C(G; »´N) for all »´N 2 PNccb. We claim that E is superadditive and
satisfles condition (CC) of Theorem A.
To check superadditivity, let S; T ‰ N , S; T 6= ;, S \ T = ;, B1 2 E(S)
and B2 2 E(T ). If T 2 W (or S 2 W ), B1 = A (B2 = A), and consequently
B1 \ B2 2 E(S [ T ). Thus assume that both S and T are not winning. If S or
T are losing, then again B1 \ B2 2 E(S [ T ) by the monotonicity of E. Hence it
remains to consider the possibility that both S and T are blocking. In this case
there are B01; B
0
2 2 A⁄ such that Bi ¾ AnB0i, i = 1; 2. Let B0 be the convex hull of
B01 [ B02. Then B0 2 A⁄ is open, convex, and bounded, and B1 \ B2 ¾ AnB0. As
AnB0 2 E(S [ T ), E is indeed superadditive.
It remains to prove (CC). Let S ‰ N , S 6= ;; N . Further, let »´N 2 PNccb, and
x 2 A. We should prove that
(1) Pr(S; »´N ; x) =2 E(S)) AnPr(S; »´N ; x) 2 E(NnS):
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If S 2W or NnS 2W , then (1) is obviously true. Thus, let S be blocking. By our
assumptions, Pr(S; »´N ; x) is open, convex, and bounded. Hence, AnPr(S; »´N ; x) 2
E(NnS) because NnS is blocking.
We may now apply Theorem A to obtain a GF ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) that
implements C(E; ¢) in SNE’s (over PNccb). Clearly, ¡ implements C(G; ¢) in SNE’s.
Furthermore, for S 2 W , E¡fi(S) = E(S), that is E¡fi(S) = 2A. Also, if S =2 W , then
clearly E¡fi(S) 6= 2A. Thus, G¡fi = G.
Remark 3.2 Theorem 3.1 can be generalized in two directions: (i) It is possible
to replace Rm by a closed, convex, and unbounded subset of Rm. (ii) Pccb may be
replaced by Pcb, the set of continuous and bounded preferences over Rm.
4 Representations of weak games
In this and the following sections, we consider choice problems (G;A) for which A
is a convex and compact subset of some Euclidean space. In the present section,
we consider the case where the game is weak, that is there is a vetoer. It will be
shown that in this case the representation problem has a solution for all convex and
compact sets of alternatives A.
Thus, let A be a convex and compact subset of Rm, m ‚ 1. Assume that
afi(A) = Rm (here, afi(A) is the a–ne hull of A).
Theorem 4.1 Let G = (N;W ) be a weak game, that is V = \fS j S 2 Wg 6= ;.
Assume that N = f1; : : : ; ng and 1 2 V . Then there exists a strong representation
of G (on A), that is, there exists a GF ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) with the following
properties:
(i) G¡fi = G, and
(ii) ¡ is SNE-consistent.
Remark 4.2 If ¡ is a strong representation of G, then for each »´N 2 PNcc
…(SNE(¡; »´N)) ‰ C(E¡fl ; »´N) ‰ C(E¡fi ; »´N) ‰ C(G¡fi; »´N) = C(G; »´N):
Hence, ¡ partially implements the core C(G; ¢).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We deflne an EF E that extends G by the following rules:
E(S) = 2A if S 2 W (here 2A = fB ‰ A j B 6= ;g), E(S) = fAg if NnS 2 W and
S 6= ;, and E(;) = ;. In order to complete the deflnition of E we choose an open
ball B0 such that clB0 ‰ intA, and let D0 = AnB0. If S ‰ N is blocking and 1 2 S,
then we deflne
(4:1) E(S) = fD j D ‰ A and D \D0 6= ;g
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A
D0
B0
Fig. 4.1
and
(4:2) E(NnS) = fD j D ‰ A and D ¾ D0g:
This completes the deflnition of E.
We claim that C(E; »´N) 6= ; for all »´N 2 PNcc . Indeed, if S ‰ N is blocking
and 1 =2 S, then domination of a 2 A via S is impossible due to the convexity of
preferences, since Pr(S; »´N ; a) is convex and does not contain a, and S is not efiec-
tive for any set B for which conv(B) 6= A. Thus, every alternative in argmaxA »´ 1
belongs to C(E; »´N).
Next, we prove that E is superadditive. Let Si ‰ N , i = 1; 2, S1 \ S2 = ;, and
let Bi 2 E(Si), i = 1; 2. If S1 or S2 is winning, then B1\B2 2 E(S1[S2). Similarly,
if S1 or S2 are losing, then B1 \B2 2 E(S1 [S2) by the monotonicity of E. Finally,
if both S1 and S2 are blocking, then B1 \B2 2 E(S1 [ S2) by (4.1) and (4.2).
Finally, we check that E satisfles (CC) (see Theorem A). Let S ‰ N , S 6= ;; N ,
let »´N 2 PNcc , and let x 2 A. We must show
(4:3) Pr(S; »´N ; x) =2 E(S)) AnPr(S; »´N ; x) 2 E(NnS):
If S 2W or NnS 2W , then (4.3) is true, Thus, let S be blocking; (4.3) now follows
from (4.1) and (4.2).
By Theorem A there exists a GF ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) such that
(4:4) …(SNE(¡; »´N)) = C(E; »´N)
for every »´N 2 PNcc , and
(4:5) E¡fi(S) ¾ E(S) for all S 2 P (N):
By (4.4), ¡ is strongly consistent, becauseE is stable. Finally, by (4.5),(4.1),(4.2),
and the proof of Theorem A, G¡fi = G.
The core of a weak game may not be (fully) implementable in SNE’s by strong
representations. This is shown by the following example.
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(0,1) (1,1)
(0,1)(0,0)
-x-y = 0
2x+y = const.
x+2y = const.
Fig. 4.2
Example 4.3 Let G = [3; 2; 1; 1] and let A = [0; 1]2. Further, let »´N 2 PNcc (A) be
given by the following utility functions:
u1(x; y) = ¡x¡ y;
u2(x; y) = 2x+ y;
u3(x; y) = x+ 2y:
Then C(G; uN) = f(0; 0); (1; 1)g:
Let ¡ = (§1;§2;§3; …;A) be a strong representation of G. We claim that (1; 1) =2
…(SNE(¡; uN)). Indeed, if there is an SNE ¾N of (¡; uN) such that …(¾N) = (1; 1),
then f2; 3g is fi-efiective for (1; 1). Consider now the following proflle:
u^1(x; y) = ¡y;
u^2(x; y) = x+ y;
u^3(x; y) = 2y ¡ x:
As the reader may check, C(E¡fi ; u^
N) = ;, because f(1; 1)g 2 E¡fi(f2; 3g) and G¡fi = G.
However, this contradicts the SNE-consistency of ¡.
5 Strictly convex sets of alternatives
For games without vetoers, the structure of the set A will matter for the existence
of a strong representation on A of a committee G. Indeed, in the present section we
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(0,1) (1,1)
(0,1)(0,0)
2y-x = 1
x+y = const.
-y = const.
Fig. 4.3
show that if the set A is strictly convex and has a smooth boundary, then (G;A)
has no strong representation. We start by treating the special case of m = 2; the
impossibility result derived in this context may then be extended to an impossibility
result for arbitrary dimension m.
Let A ‰ R2 be a convex and compact set of alternatives. We assume that
afi(A) = R2. Let G = (N;W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game. Fur-
thermore, let ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n;A; …) be a strong representation of G, that is, ¡ is
SNE-consistent and G¡fi = G. A coalition S 2 2N is almost winning with respect to
¡ if for every x 2 bdA and every " > 0, fy 2 A j ky ¡ xk < "g 2 E¡fi(S) (here, bdA
is the boundary of A). We now recall that a (proper) face of A is a set F ‰ bdA,
F 6= ;, with the following property: There exist p 2 R2nf0g and fi 2 R such that
F = fx 2 A j p ¢ x = fig
(if a face is a singleton, then it consists of an exposed point). Using this term we can
now introduce our last (new) concept in this section: A coalition S 2 2N is weakly
winning with respect to ¡ if every open neighborhood of every face of A is in E¡fi(S).
Throughout the rest of this section we assume that A is smooth, that is, at each
x 2 bdA, A has a unique tangent.
The following lemma uses all the concepts introduced previously:
Lemma 5.1 Let A ‰ R2 convex and compact with afi(A) = R2, such that A is
smooth, let G = (N;W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game, and let ¡ be a
strong representation of G.
If S1 and S2 are almost winning coalitions with respect to ¡, then T = S1 \S2 is
weakly winning with respect to ¡.
Proof: Let F ‰ bdA be a (proper) face of A, and let U be an open set (in A)
containing F . We shall prove that U 2 E¡fi(T ). Two cases must be distinguished:
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(i) F is a point, and
(ii) F is an interval (with positive length).
We shall deal only with case (ii) (the proof in case (i) is similar to that of case (ii)).
Thus, let F = [a; b] with a 6= b. There exists p 2 R2nf0g such that (i) F = fy 2
A j p ¢ y = p ¢ ag, and (ii) p ¢ a ‚ p ¢ x for all x 2 A. We now choose – > 0 such
that U ¾ fx 2 A j p ¢ x > p ¢ a ¡ –g. We also can choose q1; q2 2 R2nf0g with the
following properties: qi ¢p < 0, i = 1; 2, q1 ¢q2 < 0, and fx 2 A j q1 ¢x = q1 ¢ag[fx 2
A j q2 ¢ x = q2 ¢ bg is contained in fx 2 A j p ¢ x > p ¢ a ¡ –g. Now we deflne the
utility proflle uN by
(i) ui(y) = p ¢ y, i 2 T ,
(ii) ui(y) = q1 ¢ y, i 2 S1nT , and
(iii) ui(y) = q2 ¢ y, i 2 NnS1.
As the reader may check, C(E¡fi ; u
N) ‰ [a; b] (notice that C(G; uN) = [a; b]). The
game (¡; uN) has an SNE ¾ because ¡ is SNE-consistent. Clearly,
x = …(¾) 2 C(E¡fl ; uN) ‰ C(E¡fi ; uN) ‰ [a; b]:
Now fy 2 A j y ´i x for all i 2 NnTg ¾ fy 2 A j p ¢ y • p ¢ a¡ –g. Hence,
…(¾T ; „NnT ) 2 fy 2 A j p ¢ y > p ¢ a¡ –g ‰ U for all „NnT 2 §NnT :
Therefore U 2 E¡fi(T ).
Lemma 5.1 has an important corollary. First we recall that A is strictly convex
if for all x; y 2 A, x 6= y, and all 0 < fi < 1, fix+ (1¡ fi)y 2 intA.
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Theorem 5.2 Let A ‰ R2 be strictly convex, compact, and smooth, with afi(A) =
R2, and let G = (N;W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game without veto
players. Then G has no strong representation on A.
Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that G has a strong representation ¡ on A. If S 2
2N is weakly winning with respect to ¡, then S is almost winning, because every x 2
bdA is an exposed point of A. Thus, by Lemma 5.1, the intersection of two almost
winning coalitions is almost winning. Now every S 2 W is winning with respect
to ¡, since G¡fi = G; hence, in particular, it is almost winning. By assumption,
\fS j S 2 Wg = ;. Hence, there exist two disjoint almost winning coalitions (with
respect to ¡). Clearly, this contradicts the superadditivity of E¡fi .
We now generalize Theorem 5.2 to m ‚ 3.
Theorem 5.3 Let A ‰ Rm, m ‚ 3, be strictly convex, compact, and smooth, and
let afi (A) = Rm. Let G = (N;W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game without
veto players. Then G has no strong representation on A.
Proof: Assume, on the contrary, thatG has a strong representation ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A)
on A. For a = (x1; x2; x3; : : : ; xm) 2 Rm, let x1 = x, x2 = y, and z = (x3; : : : ; xm).
Denote by p the projection of Rm on the subspace given by z = 0, that is,
p(x; y; z) = (x; y; 0):
Let A^ = p(A) = fp(a) j a 2 Ag. Then A^ is strictly convex, compact, and
smooth. Furthermore afi (A^) is two-dimensional. Now, deflne a GF ¡^ on A^ by
¡^ = (§1; : : : ;§n; p – …; A^), and let G^ = G¡^fi. By our assumption, G¡fi = G. Hence,
if G^ = (N; W^ ), then W^ ¾ W . Thus, G^ has no vetoers. Also, by its deflnition,
G^ is proper and monotonic. We shall conclude the proof by showing that ¡^ is
SNE-consistent.
Let (ui(x; y; 0))i2N , be a utility proflle for ¡^, that is, each ui is continuous and
quasi-concave on A^. Let vi(x; y; z) = ui(x; y; 0) for all (x; y; z) 2 A and i 2 N .
Then vN is a utility proflle for ¡. Thus, the game (¡; vN) has an SNE. Moreover, as
vi(x; y; z) = ui(p(x; y; z)) for all i 2 N and (x; y; z) 2 A, (¡; vN) = (¡^; uN). Thus,
¡^ is SNE-consistent. Therefore, ¡^ is a strong representation of G^, contradicting
Theorem 5.2.
6 An impossibility result for small Nakamura num-
bers
The choice problems (G;A) considered in the previous section do not exhaust the
possibilities for choice problems with no strong representation. We show in this
section that if the Nakamura number of G is less than 6, then no strong represen-
tation exists; this impossibility result holds for general convex and compact sets of
alternatives.
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Let A ‰ R2 be a convex and compact set, let afi(A) = R2, and let G = (N;W ) be
a proper and monotonic simple game. We will prove in this section the following
impossibility result: If ”(G) 2 f4; 5; 6g, then G has no strong representation on A.
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 Let A ‰ R2 be convex and compact, let afi(A) = R2, let G = (N;W )
be a proper and monotonic simple game, and let the GF ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) be a
strong representation of G. If S1; S2 2W , then T = S1 \ S2 is weakly winning with
respect to ¡.
Proof: Let F ‰ bdA be a (proper) face of A and let U be an open set (in A)
containing F . We shall prove that U 2 E¡fi(T ).
Let a 2 F . There exists p 2 R2nf0g such that
(i) F = fx 2 A j p ¢ x = p ¢ ag; and
(ii) p ¢ a ‚ p ¢ x for all x 2 A.
Clearly, there exists – > 0 such that
U ¾ fx 2 A j p ¢ x > p ¢ a¡ –g:
We now choose a convex, compact, and smooth set A^ such that
(i) fx 2 A j p ¢ x • p ¢ a¡ –g ‰ intA^, and
(ii) a 2 bdA^ and the line p ¢ x = p ¢ a is tangent to A^ at a.
Using A^ we deflne two utility functions in the following way: Let xi 2 intA \ intA^,
i = 1; 2, such that a, x1, and x2 are not on the same line. Denote by k¢; A^; xik,
i = 1; 2, the gauge determined by A^ with center xi, that is
ky; A^; xik = inff‚ > 0 j xi + ‚¡1(y ¡ xi) 2 A^g; i = 1; 2:
Then we deflne ui(y) = ¡ky; A^; xik, i = 1; 2.
Consider now the utility proflle uN , where
(i) ui(y) = p ¢ y, i 2 T ,
(ii) ui(y) = u1(y), i 2 S1nT , and
(iii) ui(y) = u2(y), i 2 NnS1.
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As the reader may check, C(G; uN) = F . Hence, because G¡fi = G, C(E
¡
fi ; u
N) ‰
F . The game (¡; uN) has an SNE ¾ because ¡ is SNE-consistent. Clearly,
x = …(¾) 2 C(E¡fl ; uN) ‰ C(E¡fi ; uN) ‰ C(G¡fi; uN) = C(G; uN) = F:
Also,
fy 2 A j y ´i x for all i 2 NnTg ¾ fy 2 A j p ¢ y • p ¢ a¡ –g:
Hence, for every „NnT 2 §NnT ,
…(¾T ; „NnT ) 2 fy 2 A j p ¢ y > p ¢ a¡ –g ‰ U:
Therefore, U 2 E¡fi(T ).
We proceed with the following result.
Lemma 6.2 Let A ‰ R2 be convex and compact, let afi(A) = R2, let G = (N;W )
be a proper and monotonic simple game, and let ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n : …;A) be a strong
representation of G on A. If Ti, i = 1; 2; 3 are weakly winning with respect to ¡,
then T1 \ T2 \ T2 6= ;.
Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that T1 \ T2 \ T3 = ;. We shall prove that there
exists »´N 2 PNcc such that C(E¡fi ; »´N) = ;, and thereby we arrive at the desired
contradiction. Two cases must be distinguished:
(a) A is strictly convex. Let xi, i = 1; 2; 3; be three distinct points of bdA.
Choose qi 2 R2, i 2 f1; 2; 3g such that
qi ¢ xi < qi ¢ xj = qi ¢ xk; where fi; j; kg = f1; 2; 3g:
Now deflne a utility proflle uN by
(6:1) ui(a) =
8><>:
q2 ¢ a for i 2 T1nT2;
q3 ¢ a for i 2 T2nT3;
q1 ¢ a for i 2 (T3nT1) [Nn(T1 [ T2 [ T3).
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Denote by Hk the convex cone spanned by fxi ¡ xk; xj ¡ xkg, where fi; j; kg =
f1; 2; 3g. Then xi 2 E¡fi(Ti) (because xi is an exposed point of A and Ti is weakly
winning), and uk(xi) > u
k(a) for all a 2 int[fxig+Hi] and k 2 Ti, i = 1; 2; 3. Thus, if
y 2 Anfx1; x2; x3g, then y =2 C(E¡fi ; uN). Finally, let i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g, i 6= j. By strict
convexity of A there exists an exposed point x0j near xj such that xi 2 int[fx0jg+Hj].
Hence, xi =2 C(E¡fi ; uN). Therefore, C(E¡fi ; uN) = ;.
(b) A is not strictly convex. Then bdA contains a one-dimensional face [x1; x2].
Here two subcases must be distinguished:
(b.1) x1 and x2 are exposed points of A. Let x3 be a third exposed point of A
(here we use the assumption that afi (A) = R2). Now we choose three linear utility
functions in the following way. Let q2 2 R2 satisfy
q2 ¢ x1 > q2 ¢ x3 > q2 ¢ x2:
It is possible now to choose y 2 bdA near x3 on the arc of bdA that connects x1
and x3 (and does not contain x2) such that
q2 ¢ x3 < q2 ¢ y < q2 ¢ x1:
Let q1 2 R2 satisfy
q1 ¢ x1 < q1 ¢ x2 = q1 ¢ y < q1 ¢ x3
(see Figure 6.2). Again, we may choose z 2 bdA near x2 such that
q1 ¢ x2 < q1 ¢ z < q1 ¢ x3:
Finally, choose q3 2 R2 such that
q3 ¢ x3 < q3 ¢ x1 = q3 ¢ z < q3 ¢ x2:
As in case (a) we deflne a utility proflle uN by (6.1). As the reader may check,
the following three open sets,
H1 = fa 2 A j q2 ¢ a < q2 ¢ x1 and q3 ¢ a < q3 ¢ x1g;
H2 = fa 2 A j q1 ¢ a < q1 ¢ x2 and q3 ¢ a < q3 ¢ x2g; and
H3 = fa 2 A j q2 ¢ a < q2 ¢ x3 and q1 ¢ a < q1 ¢ x3g
cover A. Moreover, if x 2 Hi, then xi dominates x via Ti, i = 1; 2; 3. Thus
C(E¡fi ; u
N) = ;.
(b.2) x1 or x2 are not exposed points of A. Let w 2 [x1; x2] satisfy q2 ¢x3 = q2 ¢w.
Then q3 ¢ x2 > q3 ¢ w. We can choose exposed points x01, x02 of A near x1 and x2,
respectively, such that
q2 ¢ x01 > q2 ¢ x3 > q2 ¢ x02 and
q2 ¢ x3 < q2 ¢ y < q2 ¢ x01:
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Now choose q01 2 R2 such that
q01 ¢ x01 < q01 ¢ x02 = q01 ¢ y < q01 ¢ x3:
Clearly, if x02 is su–ciently close to x2, then q
0
1 ¢ x02 < q01 ¢ z < q01 ¢ x3. Finally, choose
q03 2 R2 such that
q03 ¢ x3 < q03 ¢ x01 = q03 ¢ z < q03 ¢ x02:
Again, we may choose x01; x
0
2; q
0
1 and q
0
3 such that q
0
3 ¢ x02 > q03 ¢w. We now deflne uN
and Hi, i = 1; 2; 3, as in the case (b.1) and obtain, again, that C(E
¡
fi ; u
N) = ;.
The main result of this section can now be proved.
Theorem 6.3 Let m ‚ 2, let A ‰ Rm be convex and compact, let afi(A) = Rm,
and let G = (N;W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game. If ”(G) • 6, then G
has no strong representation on A.
Proof: As in Section 5, it is su–cient to consider the casem = 2. Assume now, on the
contrary, that G has a strong representation ¡ on A. As ”(G) • 6, there exist three
weakly winning coalitions with respect to ¡, T1; T2 and T3, such that T1\T2\T3 = ;
(see Lemma 6.1). By Lemma 6.2 we obtain the desired contradiction.
Notice that the only new cases which are excluded by Theorem 6.3 are: m = 2,
”(G) 2 f4; 5; 6g, m = 3, ”(G) 2 f5; 6g, and m = 4 and ”(G) = 6. In all other cases
impossibility is implied by Le Breton (1987).
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7 A game with no vetoers that has a strong rep-
resentation
In the light of the impossibility results obtained in the previous sections, one might
be tempted to believe that impossibility hold generally, that is for all choice problems
(G;A) where G has no vetoers. It is shown in this section that this is not the case;
indeed we flnd a strong representation of the game (7; 6) on a particular set of
alternatives, namely the standard simplex in R3, and the method can be applied to
give a strong representation of any game (n; n¡ 1) on this set alternatives.
Let X = fx1; x2; x3g be a set of three a–nely independent points in R2, let
A = conv(X) (the convex hull of X), and let G = (N;W ) = (7; 6), that is, N =
f1; : : : ; 7g and
W = fS ‰ N j jSj ‚ 6g:
We shall prove that G has a strong representation on A.
Deflne an EF E : P (N)! P (P (A)) as follows: For S ‰ N , let
E(S) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
2A if jSj ‚ 6,
fB j jB \Xj ‚ 1g if jSj = 5,
fB j jB \Xj ‚ 2g if 3 • jSj • 4,
fB j B ¾ Xg if jSj = 2,
fAg if jSj = 1,
; if S = ;.
As the reader may check, E is superadditive and maximal. We shall prove that E
is stable, that is, C(E; »´N) 6= ; for every »´N 2 PNcc .
Let »´N 2 PNcc and let ui : A ! R be a representation of »´ i for each i 2 N .
Without loss of generality, minx2A ui(x) = 0 for all i 2 N . We deflne now an NTU
game (N; V ) by
V (S) = f(y1; : : : ; yn) 2 RN j 9B 2 E(S) such that inf
x2B
ui(x) ‚ yi; i 2 Sg:
We shall prove that the core of V , C(N; V ), is nonempty. Clearly, this will imply
that C(E; »´N) 6= ; and complete the proof of the stability of E.
We now observe that if 3 • jSj • 5, then V (S) is a union of three corners, that
is
V (S) =
3[
j=1
fy 2 RN j yS • cSj g;
where cSj 2 RS+, j = 1; 2; 3. We call the corner cSj idle if mini2S cij = 0. We replace
each idle corner cSj , 3 • jSj • 5, 1 • j • 3, by 0S and obtain a new game (N; V^ ).
Observe that
(7:1) min
1•j•3
ui(xj) = 0 for all i 2 N;
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(ui is quasiconcave for i 2 N and minx2A ui(x) = 0).
Hence, for jSj = 3; 4, V^ (S) is a union of at most two corners (where one of them
is determined by 0S). Similarly, if jSj = 5, then V^ (S) is the union of at most three
corners, and one of them is determined by 0S (in the foregoing discussion we did not
distinguish between a corner fy 2 RN j yS • cSg and the vector cS). We remark
that C(N; V ) = C(N; V^ ) (V^ (S) = V (S) for jSj =2 f3; 4; 5g).
We shall prove that C(N; V^ ) 6= ; by showing that (N; V^ ) is balanced. Thus, let
B ‰ 2N be a balanced collection with balancing weights (‚S)S2B, and let
„y = („y1; : : : ; „yn) 2 \
S2B
V^ (S):
We must show that „y 2 V^ (N) (= V (N)).
Denote
Ai = fx 2 A j ui(x) ‚ „yig; i 2 N:
Then Ai is a nonempty convex set for each i 2 N . Also, if „yi • 0, then Ai = A. We
shall prove the following claim.
Lemma 7.1 If S ‰ N and jSj = 3, then \i2SAi 6= ;.
Let S = fi1; i2; i3g ‰ N and let S+ = fi 2 S j „yi > 0g. If there exists S 0 2 B
such that S 0 ¾ S+, then Lemma 7.1 is true. Therefore, we shall assume in the
sequel:
(7:2) There exists no S 0 2 B such that S 0 ¾ S+.
The following result will be used in the proof of Lemma 7.1.
Lemma 7.2 If the following condition is satisfled,
(7:3) [S 0 \ fi1; i2g 6= ; and S 0 2 B]) jS0j ‚ 5;
then there exists S 0 2 B such that i1; i2 2 S 0 and jS 0j = 5.
Proof of Lemma 7.2: Assume, on the contrary, that there exists no S 0 2 B such that
i1; i2 2 S 0 and jS 0j = 5. Let T = NnS and for each j, j = 1; 2; 3, let
aj =
Xf‚S0 j S 0 2 B; ij 2 S 0; T ‰ S 0; and jS 0j = 5g;
bj =
Xf‚S0 j S 0 2 B; ij 2 S 0; jT \ S 0j = 3; and jS 0j = 5g;
cj =
X
k 6=j
‚Nnfikg;
where, by convention, ‚Nnfikg = 0 if Nnfikg =2 B. By (7.2) and (7.3),
(7:4) aj + bj + cj = 1; j = 1; 2:
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Also, by (all) the foregoing assumptions, there exists j 2 T such that
1 =
Xf‚S0 j j 2 S 0 and S 0 2 Bg
‚ a1 + a2 + a3 + 1
2
(c1 + c2 + c3) +
3
4
(b1 + b2)(7:5)
We now consider the following possibilities:
(a) a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = c3 = 0: In this case Nnfi3g is the unique set of B which
contains i1 and i2. Also, as c3 = 0 and „y
i3 > 0, there exists S 0 2 B such that i3 2 S 0
and 3 • jS 0j • 5. As S 0 \ (Nnfi3g) 6= ;, this contradicts the balancedness of B.
Thus, (a) is impossible.
(b) a1 + a2 + b1 + b2 + c3 > 0: By (7.4) and (7.5),
1 >
1
2
(a1 + a2) +
1
2
(c1 + c2) +
1
2
(b1 + b2) = 1:
Hence, (b) is also impossible, and the desired contradiction has been obtained. We
conclude that there exists S 0 2 B such that jS 0j = 5 and i1; i2 2 S 0.
We shall now prove Lemma 7.1.
Proof of Lemma 7.1: Let T = fS 0 2 B j jS 0j 2 f3; 4gg. We say that i 2 S is
covered by T if there exists S0 2 T such that i 2 S 0. We distinguish the following
possibilities:
(a) Every i 2 S+ is covered by T : Here, we further have to consider the following
subcases:
(a.1) There exist two sets S 01; S
0
2 2 T such that S 01 [ S 02 ¾ S+: We have for each
j two extreme points xj;1; xj;2 such that
ui(xj;h) ‚ „yi for all i 2 S+ \ S 0j and h = 1; 2:
Let x 2 fx1;1; x1;2g \ fx2;1; x2;2g. Then ui(x) ‚ „yi for all i 2 S.
(a.2) There exist three sets S 0j in T such that fijg = S+ \ S 0j, j = 1; 2; 3: Again,
for each j there exist two extreme points xj;1; xj;2, such that
ui(xj;h) ‚ „yi for all i 2 S 0j and h = 1; 2:
Clearly, there exist 1 • j1; j2 • 3, j1 6= j2, such that S 0j1 \ S 0j2 6= ;. Without loss of
generality j1 = 1 and j2 = 2. Let k 2 S 01 \ S 02. Then
minfui1(x1;1); ui1(x1;2)g ‚ „yi1 > 0
implies, by the construction of V^ , that minfuk(x1;1); uk(x1;2)g > 0. Similarly,
minfuk(x2;1); uk(x2;2)g > 0. Therefore, by (7.1), fx1;1; x1;2g = fx2;1; x2;2g. As
fx1;1; x1;2g \ fx3;1; x3;2g 6= ;, we have that \i2SAi 6= ;.
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(b) Only two members of S+, say i1 and i2, are covered by T : There exist
S01; S
0
2 2 T such that ij 2 S+ \ S 0j, j = 1; 2 (S 01 = S 02 is not excluded). Thus,
i3 2 S+ \ S 0 for some S 0 2 B with jS 0j ‚ 5. We distinguish the following subcases:
(b.1) There exists S 0 2 B such that i3 2 S 0 and jS 0j = 5: There is an extreme
point x such that ui3(x) ‚ „yi3 > 0. Clearly, S 01 \ S 0 6= ;. Let k 2 S 01 \ S 0. We have
uk(x) > 0 by the construction of V^ . By (7.1) and the deflnition of V^ , ui1(x) ‚ „yi1 .
Similarly, ui2(x) ‚ „yi2 . Thus, x 2 \x2SAi.
(b.2) i3 2 S 0 2 B ) jS 0j = 6: By (7.2), i3 is contained in at most two members
S 0 of B with jS 0j = 6. Let these coalitions be T1 and T2 (where T1 = T2 is possible).
As jT1 \ T2j ‚ 5, T1 \ T2 \ S 02 6= ; contradicting our assumption that B is balanced
(we assume ‚T > 0 for T 2 B). Thus (b.2) is impossible.
(c) Only one member of S+, say i1, is covered by T : By Lemma 7.2 there exists
S 0 2 B such that i2; i3 2 S 0 and jS 0j = 5. Without loss of generality i2 2 S+. There
is an extreme point x such that ui2(x) ‚ „yi2 > 0, and ui3(x) ‚ „yi3 . Let i1 2 S 01 2 T .
Then S 0 \ S 01 6= ;. Let k 2 S 0 \ S 01. Then uk(x) > 0 by the deflnition of V^ . By (7.1)
and the deflnition of V^ , ui1(x) ‚ „yi1 > 0. Thus, x 2 \i2SAi.
(d) No member of S+ is covered by T : By Lemma 7.2 and (7.2) there exist three
coalitions S 0j 2 B such that jS 0jj = 5 and S 0j ¾ S+nfijg for j = 1; 2; 3. For each j
there exists an extreme point zj such that
ui(zj) ‚ „yi > 0 for i 2 S+nfijg:
Let k 2 S 01 \ S 02 \ S 03. By the deflnition of V^ , uk(zj) > 0 for j = 1; 2; 3. Hence,
by (7.1), there exist j1; j2 2 f1; 2; 3g, j1 6= j2, such that zj1 = zj2 . Clearly, zj1 2
\i2SAi.
Now we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3 (N; V ) has a nonempty core.
Proof: Using the previous notation it is su–cient to prove that (N; V^ ) is bal-
anced. By Lemma 7.1 and Helly’s Theorem (see Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 21.6)),
\i2NAi 6= ;. Hence „y 2 V^ (N) (= V (N)) and (N; V^ ) is balanced. By Scarf (1967),
C(N; V^ ) 6= ;. Finally, by the deflnition of V^ , C(N; V^ ) = C(N; V ).
Theorem 7.4 The game (7,6) has a strong representation on A.
Proof: Using the previous notations we have that the EF E is superadditive,
maximal, and stable. By Theorem A in the Appendix there exists a GF ¡ =
(§1; : : : ;§7; …;A) that implements the core of E. As the reader may check, if ¡ is
constructed according to the proof of Theorem A, then ¡ is a strong representation
of (7; 6).
The following generalization of Theorem 7.4 is true:
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Theorem 7.5 Let X = fx1; x2; x3g be a set of three a–nely independent points
in R2, let A = conv(X), and let G = (n; n ¡ 1), n ‚ 7. Then G has a strong
representation on A.
Proof: Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the set of players of G. Further, let
n1 =
•
n
3
‚
+ 1; n2 =
•
2n
3
‚
+ 1;
and let N1 = fk 2 N j 2 • k < n1g, N2 = fk 2 N j n1 • k < n2g, and
N3 = fk 2 N j n2 • k < n ¡ 1g. Deflne an EF E : P (N) ! P (P (A)) by the
following rules: For S ‰ N , let
E(S) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
2A if jSj ‚ n¡ 1,
fB j jB \Xj ‚ 1g if jSj 2 N3,
fB j jB \Xj ‚ 2g if jSj 2 N2,
fB j B ¾ Xg if jSj 2 N1,
fAg if jSj = 1,
; if S = ;.
As the reader may check, E is superadditive and maximal. For the rest of the proof
of this theorem, the reader should precisely follow the steps of the proof of Theorem
7.4 (with obvious changes in the notation). We have checked that the details remain
valid.
8 The case m = 1
The last class of choice problems to be considered in this paper is that consisting
of choice problems (G;A) with A a convex and compact subset of one-dimensional
Euclidean space, that is an interval on the real line, where the strong representation
problem always has a solution.
Let A = [a; „a], a < „a, be an interval, and let G = (N;W ) be a proper and
monotonic simple game. For the sake of completeness we shall indicate how to
implement the core C(G;A; »´N) = C(G; »´N) when »´N 2 PNcc . If G is not strong,
then the core C(G; ¢) is a set-valued function. Therefore we need to construct a
special GF, albeit simple, to implement the core.
Theorem 8.1 Let A = [a; „a], where a < „a, and let G = (N;W ) be a proper and
monotonic simple game. Then there exists a GF ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) that partially
implements the core C(G; ¢) and is also a representation of G.
Proof: Let §i = A for every i 2 N , and let
…(x1; : : : ; xn) = minfy 2 A j fi 2 N j xi • yg 2Wg
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for all (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 AN . … is the well-known committee rule (for the committee G).
The reader is referred to Barberµa, Gul and Stachetti (1994) for a study of committee
rules. Let ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A). We flrst check that G¡fi = G. Clearly, if S 2 W ,
then E¡fi(S) = 2
A. Now, let S 2 2NnW , and let a • x < „a. Then S is not fi-efiective
for x. Thus, G¡fi = G, and for every »´N 2 PNcc
…(SNE(¡; »´N)) ‰ C(E¡fl ; »´N) ‰ C(E¡fi ; »´N) ‰ C(G¡fi; »´N) = C(G; »´N):
It remains to prove that ¡ is SNE-consistent. Let »´N 2 PNcc . Deflne the \right
peak" of i by
piR = maxfy 2 A j y »´ ix for all x 2 Ag;
and let
pR = minfpiR j fj j pjR • piRg 2Wg:
As the reader may verify, pR 2 C(G; »´N). Let ¾ = (pR; : : : ; pR). We claim that ¾
is an SNE of (¡; »´N). Indeed, no S 2W has a profltable deviation from ¾, because
pR 2 C(G; »´N). Now, let x 2 A, x 6= pR. If x > pR, then fi j x ´i pRg = S is
losing (i.e., NnS 2 W ). Therefore, …(„S; ¾NnS) = pR for every „S 2 §S. Finally,
if x < pR then fi j x ´i pRg = S is not winning. Therefore …(„S; ¾NnS) ‚ pR for
every „S 2 §S. Thus, ¾ is an SNE of (¡; »´N).
9 Concluding remarks
In this section we flrst summarize the main results of our work, and then comment
on possible future continuations. We start with a formulation of a result which is
implied by Zhou (1991). Let A be a convex and compact subset of Rm, m ‚ 2, let
afi(A) = Rm, and let G = (N;W ) be a non-dictatorial committee (that is fig =2 W
for all i 2 N , and N 2W ; thus, in particular, n ‚ 2). Further, let f : PNcc ! A be a
social choice function, and let Gffi = G (notice that G
f
fi is well deflned because f is a
GF). Then f is manipulable (the reader may notice that every representation of G is
surjective, because N 2W ). Thus, the choice problem (G;A) has no strategy-proof
representations. However, we have shown that when (G;A) is stable (that is the
core C(G;A; »´N) 6= ; for all proflles »´N of continuous and convex preferences),
it may be possible to (partially) implement the core of G, and thereby obtain a
strongly stable representation of G on A.
We have obtained the following results on the existence of strongly stable repre-
sentations of committees in economic environments. LetG = (N;W ) be a committee
with N 2W , and let A be a closed convex subset of Rm, m ‚ 2, with afi(A) = Rm.
(i) If G contains a vetoer and A is (in addition) compact, then G has a strong
representation on A.
(ii) If A = Rm, preferences are bounded, and ”(G)¡ 2 ‚ m, then strong repre-
sentations exist.
(iii) If A is compact, smooth, and strictly convex, and G has no vetoers, then
strong representations do not exist.
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(iv) If A is (in addition) compact and ”(G) • 6, then there are no strong
representations.
(v) Every symmetric game (n; n¡ 1), n ‚ 7, has a strong representation on the
standard simplex in R3.
We remark that, in our view, (i) and (ii) are important and useful results. Clearly,
(iii) and (iv) impose restrictions on our method. However, (v) shows that if the
Nakamura number of a committee exceeds 6 and the set of alternatives is not strictly
convex, then strong representations may exist (even when there are no vetoers).
The general problem of existence of strong representations of committees (without
vetoers) on polyhedral sets of alternatives is left as a subject for future research.
We conclude with some comments on the complexity of our GF’s. Let (G;A)
be a stable choice problem. We construct a strong representation of G on A by
the following two-stage procedure: (I) We flrst check whether G can be extended
to a superadditive, maximal, and stable EF E; and (II) if an extension E can be
found, then we implement the core of E in SNE’s, and thereby obtain the desired
representation. We now remark that in the results (i), (ii), and (v) mentioned
above, the deflnition of the extending EF was simple and intuitive. Furthermore,
in Theorem A, which was applied at stage (II), the deflnition of the implementing
GF is relatively simple. Thus, in all the above three cases, our GF’s are explicitly
deflned in an uncomplicated and intuitively acceptable way.
Appendix: Implementing the core of an EF on a
restricted domain
In this appendix, we state and prove a general result on implementation of efiectivity
functions when there are restrictions on the set of admissible preferences.
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng, n ‚ 2, be a set of voters and let A be a set of alternatives
(with at least two members). Further, let A be a feasible sets structure on A,
that is A ‰ P (A), and ;; A 2 A. We denote A0 = An;. Also, we assume that
fag 2 A for all a 2 A. Let P be a set of complete and transitive binary relations
on A. P specifles our restrictions on the preferences of the players. Finally, let
E : P (N)! P (A0) be an EF.
In order to formulate our result we need the following notation. Let S ‰ N ,
S 6= ;, let »´N 2 PN , and let a 2 A. We denote
Pr(S; »´N ; a) = fy 2 A j y ´i a for all i 2 Sg:
Now we can formulate our result.
Theorem A. Assume that the following conditions are satisfled:
(S) E is superadditive,
(CC) the pair (E;P) satisfles the complementarity condition: If S ‰ N , S 6=
;; N , and »´N 2 PN , then for each x 2 A,
Pr(S; »´N ; x) =2 E(S)) AnPr(S; »´N ; x) 2 E(NnS):
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Then there exists a GF ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …;A) with the following properties:
(i) ¡ implements C(E; ¢) in SNE’s on PN , that is
…(SNE(¡; »´N)) = C(E; »´N)
for every »´N 2 PN (thus, in particular, if E is stable, then ¡ is SNE-consistent),
(ii) E¡fi(S) ¾ E(S) for all S 2 P (N).
Proof: For i 2 N let
¿ i = fS ‰ N j i 2 Sg
and deflne
§i = f¾i : ¿ i ! A j ¾i(S) 2 E(S) for all S 2 ¿ ig:
To deflne the outcome function … of ¡ we need the following notation. Let ¾ =
(¾1; : : : ; ¾n) 2 §1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £§n and let T ‰ N , T 6= ;. Then i; j 2 T are ¾-equivalent,
written i » j, if ¾i(T ) = ¾j(T ). We denote by Q(T; ¾) the set of equivalence classes
of ».
Now let ¾ = (¾1; : : : ; ¾n) 2 §1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ §n. We deflne inductively a sequence
of partitions of N . Let P0(¾) = fNg. If Pk(¾) = fT1; : : : ; Trkg, k ‚ 0, then
Pk+1(¾) = Q(T1; ¾) [ ¢ ¢ ¢ [ Q(Trk ; ¾). Because N is flnite there exists a natural
number h such that Ph(¾) = Ph+1(¾). Ph(¾) = fT1; : : : ; Trhg is called the partition
associated with ¾. Now we choose a selection ‰ from A0, that is ‰ : A0 ! A and
‰(B) 2 B for all B 2 A0. Because Ph(¾) = Ph+1(¾), ¾i(Tj) = ¾l(Tj) for all i; l 2 Tj,
j = 1; : : : ; rh. Hence we may denote ¾(Tj) = ¾
i(Tj), where i 2 Tj, j = 1; : : : ; rh.
With these notations deflne the outcome function … by
…(¾) = ‰
‡
\rhj=1¾(Tj)
·
:
¾(Tj) 2 E(Tj) for all j. As E is superadditive, \rhj=1¾(Tj) 6= ;, and … is well-deflned.
This completes the deflnition of ¡.
Let now »´N 2 PN and a 2 C(E; »´N). If S ‰ N , S 6= ;; N , then Pr(S; »´N ; a) =2
E(S). Hence, by (CC), AnPr(S; »´N ; a) 2 E(NnS). Deflne an n-tuple of strate-
gies ¾ = (¾1; : : : ; ¾n) by the following rules: ¾i(N) = fag for all i 2 N ; and
¾i(S) = AnPr(NnS; »´N ; a) if i 2 S and S 6= N . Clearly, …(¾) = a. We claim
that ¾ is an SNE of (¡; »´N). As fbg 2 E(N) for all b 2 A, and a 2 C(E; »´N),
a is Pareto-optimal, and N cannot improve upon a. Suppose now that „T 2 §T is
a deviation of a coalition T ‰ N , T 6= ;; N , from ¾. Let fT1; : : : ; Trg be the par-
tition associated with (¾NnT ; „T ). By the deflnition of ¾, there exists 1 • j • r
such that NnT ‰ Tj. Without loss of generality, NnT ‰ T1. Again, by the
deflnition of ¾, (¾NnS; „T )(T1) = AnPr(NnT1; »´N ; a). Now NnT1 ‰ T ; hence
Pr(T; »´N ; a) ‰ Pr(NnT1; »´N ; a). Thus,
AnPr(NnT1; »´N ; a) ‰ AnPr(T; »´N ; a):
By the deflnitions of … and ¾,
…(¾NnT ; „T ) 2 AnPr(NnT1; »´N ; a):
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Thus, …(¾NnT ; „T ) 2 AnPr(T; »´N ; a); and ¾ is an SNE.
Clearly, by the deflnition of ¡, E¡fi(S) ¾ E(S) for all S 2 P (N) (notice that E
is monotonic with respect to the players). Hence,
…(SNE(¡; »´N)) ‰ C(Efl(¡); »´N) ‰ C(Efi(¡); »´N) ‰ C(E; »´N):
Thus, …(SNE(¡; »´N)) = C(E; »´N) for all »´N 2 PN .
10 References
ABDOU, J. and KEIDING, H. (1991), Efiectivity functions in social choice, Kluwer,
Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
ARROW, K.J. (1951), Social choice and individual values, Wiley, New York.
BARBERµA, S., GUL, F., and STACHETTI, E. (1994), \Generalized median voter
schemes and committees", Journal of Economic Theory, 61, 262 { 289.
BARBERµA, S. and PELEG, B. (1990), \Strategy-proof voting schemes with con-
tinuous preferences", Social Choice and Welfare, 7, 31 { 38.
BLACK, D. (1948), \On the rationale of group decision making", Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 56, 23 { 34.
DUTTA, B. and PATTANAIK, P.K. (1978), \On nicely consistent voting systems",
Econometrica, 46, 163 { 170.
ENELOW, J.M. and HINICH, M.J. (1984), The spatial theory of voting, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
GIBBARD, A. (1973), \Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result", Econo-
metrica, 41, 587 { 601.
GREENBERG, J. (1979), \Consistent majority rules over compact sets of alterna-
tives", Econometrica, 47, 627 { 636.
HOLZMAN, R. (1986a), \On strong represetnations of games by social choice func-
tions", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 15, 39 { 57.
HOLZMAN, R. (1986b), \The capacity of a committee", Mathematical Social Sci-
ences, 12, 139 { 157.
ISHIKAWA, S. and NAKAMURA, K. (1980), \Representations of characteristic
function games by social choice functions", International Journal of Game
Theory, 9, 191 { 199.
LE BRETON, M. (1987), \On the core of voting games", Social Choice and Welfare,
4, 295 { 305.
MASKIN, E.S. (1985), \The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: a sur-
vey", in: L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein (eds.), Social Goals
26
and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge), 173 { 204.
MOULIN, H. (1980), \On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness", Public Choice,
35, 437 { 455.
MOULIN, H. and PELEG, B. (1982), \Cores of efiectivity functions and implemen-
tation theory", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 115 { 145.
NAKAMURA, K. (1979), \The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences",
International Journal of Game Theory, 8, 55 { 61.
PELEG, B. (1978a), \Consistent voting systems", Econometrica, 46, 153 { 161.
PELEG, B. (1978b), \Representations of simple games by social choice functions",
International Journal of Game Theory, 7, 81 { 94.
PELEG, B. (1984), Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
ROCKAFELLAR, R.T. (1970), Convex analysis, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, New Jersey.
SATTERTHWAITE, M.A. (1975), \Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: ex-
istence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare
functions", Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187 { 217.
SCARF, H. (1967), \The core of an n-person game", Econometrica, 35, 50 { 69.
SPRUMONT, Y. (1995), \Strategy-proof collective choice in economic and political
environments", Canadian Journal of Economics, 28, 68 { 107.
ZHOU, L. (1991), \Impossibility of strategy-proof mechanisms in economies with
pure public goods", Review of Economic Studies, 58, 107 { 119.
27
